This tracker is no longer updated. Every maintained upstream stable line carries the fix, as do Debian, Proxmox VE, every tracked NixOS ref, Rocky Linux / RHEL 10, 9 and 8, and all three Amazon Linux 2023 kernel streams.

Summary

FieldDetail
CVE IDCVE-2025-39964
ComponentKernel: crypto AF_ALG socket API — the sendmsg write path shared by algif_skcipher and algif_aead (crypto/af_alg.c, include/crypto/if_alg.h)
TypeRace condition (CWE-362). Two threads issuing sendmsg() on the same AF_ALG socket run af_alg_sendmsg() concurrently with no exclusion. The interleaved updates to the per-socket transmit scatterlist (ctx->tsgl_list) leave it inconsistent: a writer that took an error exit with cur == 0 can underflow the scatterlist so a later entry is fabricated from kernel list pointers
ImpactKernel heap out-of-bounds read and write: the bogus scatterlist entry is handed to the cipher on the read path (af_alg_pull_tsgl()), so a recvmsg() encrypts or decrypts arbitrary kernel memory back to userspace (disclosure), and memcpy_from_msg() on the underflowed entry writes attacker-controlled bytes to an attacker-influenced address (local privilege escalation). A bad page_link also oopses (DoS). Not remotely reachable
Upstream fix1b34cbbf4f01 (crypto: af_alg - Disallow concurrent writes in af_alg_sendmsg); first in v6.17
Introduced8ff590903d5f in v2.6.38 (2011) — the original skcipher user-space interface has allowed unserialised concurrent writes from the start, so every kernel from 2.6.38 up to the fix is in-window
Affected window2.6.38 through 6.16 without the backport. Fixed in v6.17 and the 6.16 / 6.12 / 6.6 / 6.1 / 5.15 / 5.10 stable backports; 6.18, 7.0, 7.1, 7.2 and later branched after v6.17 and carry the fix from their first release (per-branch First fixed below). Every tracked distribution has since shipped the fix in its supported kernels
DiscovererMuhammad Alifa Ramdhan and Bing-Jhong Billy Jheng (STAR Labs SG)
Public PoCn1k0oowang/CVE-2025-39964_EXP — a third-party local-root exploit in C (offset-tuned per kernel; overwrites core_pattern)
KEV / EPSS / CVSSIn the CISA KEV catalog since 2026-09-18 (BOD 26-04 remediation due 2026-09-21); CISA’s SSVC marks exploitation active. Kernel CNA: CVSS 3.1 7.8 HIGH (AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H), mirrored by NVD’s CNA metric. Red Hat: 7.3 Moderate (AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:H, draft) — see Risk notes. EPSS 0.79% (54th percentile)
ReachabilityAF_ALG (the AF_ALG socket family, CONFIG_CRYPTO_USER_API_SKCIPHER / _AEAD), reachable by any unprivileged local user — bind() and setkey() on an AF_ALG socket perform no capability check, and the algif_skcipher / algif_aead modules autoload on demand. No CAP_*, container, or user namespace is required. The bug is local only and arch-independent. See Detection and Mitigation

How the race works

The kernel’s cryptographic user API, AF_ALG, lets a user-space process drive an in-kernel cipher over a socket: socket(AF_ALG, …), bind() to an algorithm, sendmsg() to feed plaintext or ciphertext, and recvmsg() to read the result. On the write side, af_alg_sendmsg() appends the message’s pages to a per-socket transmit scatterlist (a chain of struct af_alg_tsgl blocks) that the read side later hands to the cipher.

Nothing serialised two sendmsg() calls on the same socket. A process running two threads that both call sendmsg() on one socket runs af_alg_sendmsg() twice at once against the same ctx. The two executions interleave their updates to the scatterlist and the running counters, so the list ends up describing something neither call intended. In particular a writer that parks in af_alg_wait_for_wmem() — which the attacker forces deterministically by sizing SO_SNDBUF and filling it, then draining it with its own recvmsg() — and then takes an error exit with the current entry count cur == 0 leaves the scatterlist underflowed: the next append reads a “previous” entry that does not exist and fabricates a scatterlist entry out of adjacent kernel list pointers.

That fabricated entry is what turns a race into memory corruption. On the read path af_alg_pull_tsgl() feeds it to skcipher_recvmsg() / aead_recvmsg(), so the cipher operates on an attacker-chosen kernel address and returns the result to userspace — a kernel memory disclosure primitive, not merely a pointer leak. On a subsequent write, memcpy_from_msg(page_address(sg_page(sg)) + sg->offset + sg->length, …) copies attacker-controlled bytes to an address derived from the bogus entry — a controlled kernel write. Dereferencing the bogus page_link, and the eventual put_page() on the fabricated page, also reliably oops the machine.

The public PoC chains these into root the way several recent kernel LPEs do: it grooms the 4 KB tsgl allocations, uses the out-of-bounds write to overwrite /proc/sys/kernel/core_pattern with a pointer to its own helper binary, and then crashes a process so the kernel executes that helper as root.

The fix, 1b34cbbf4f01, adds a ctx->write flag that grants one writer exclusive ownership of the socket for the duration of a sendmsg(); a second concurrent write returns -EBUSY instead of racing. Because AF_ALG is documented as single-stream, no legitimate caller issues concurrent writes, so the change breaks nothing.

ℹ️ Old bug, not a regression. The unserialised write path dates from v2.6.38 (2011), when the skcipher AF_ALG interface was first added. There is no in-support kernel old enough to predate it: every kernel from 2.6.38 up to a fixed release is in-window. A kernel is safe only by carrying the 1b34cbbf4f01 fix — not by being old.

Vulnerable commit range

CommitRoleDescription
8ff590903d5fIntroducedcrypto: algif_skcipher - User-space interface for skcipher operations (v2.6.38, 2011) — added the AF_ALG skcipher write path with no exclusion between concurrent sendmsg() calls; algif_aead later inherited the same shared code.
1b34cbbf4f01Fixedcrypto: af_alg - Disallow concurrent writes in af_alg_sendmsg — adds a ctx->write exclusive-ownership flag so a second concurrent sendmsg() returns -EBUSY; first released in v6.17.

The reachable lifetime runs from v2.6.38 through v6.16. No in-support kernel predates the flaw, so the only not-affected kernels are those that carry the fix.

Patch status

A row is Fixed only if its kernel carries the 1b34cbbf4f01 backport (or is a v6.17-or-later line that shipped with it); every AF_ALG-capable kernel from 2.6.38 on without it is in-window and Vulnerable. The first group is the upstream kernel; the rest are a focused set of x86-64 distributions, with per-distribution detail in the sections that follow. First fixed is the first build carrying the fix and Fixed since the date it first shipped.

DistributionReleaseCurrent kernelFirst fixedFixed sinceStatus
Linux kernelmainline7.3-rc46.17-rc72025-09-21✅ Fixed — carries 1b34cbbf4f01
Linux kernel7.2.x7.2.87.22026-08-16✅ Fixed — branched after v6.17
Linux kernel6.18.x6.18.546.182025-11-30✅ Fixed — LTS, branched after v6.17
Linux kernel6.12.x6.12.1116.12.492025-09-25✅ Fixed — LTS
Linux kernel6.6.x6.6.1576.6.1082025-09-25✅ Fixed — LTS
Linux kernel6.1.x6.1.1886.1.1542025-09-25✅ Fixed — LTS
Linux kernel5.15.x5.15.2215.15.1942025-10-02✅ Fixed — LTS
Linux kernel5.10.x5.10.2705.10.2452025-10-02✅ Fixed — LTS
Debiansid (unstable)7.2.7-16.16.9-12025-09-27✅ Fixed
Debianforky (testing)7.2.6-16.16.9-12025-10-04✅ Fixed
Debian13 (trixie)6.12.107-16.12.57-12025-11-06✅ Fixed
Debian12 (bookworm)6.1.187-16.1.158-12025-11-11✅ Fixed — DSA-6053-1
Debian12 (6.12 opt-in)6.12.107-1~deb12u16.12.100-1~deb12u12026-08-04✅ Fixed
Debian11 (bullseye)5.10.262-15.10.247-12025-12-12✅ Fixed — DLA-4404-1, LTS ended
Debian11 (6.1 opt-in)6.1.180-1~deb11u16.1.158-1~deb11u12025-11-25✅ Fixed — DLA-4379-1, LTS ended
Proxmox VE9 (default)7.0.14-197.0.02026-05-21✅ Fixed — branched after v6.17
Proxmox VE9 (6.17 old)6.17.13-216.17.02025-10-06✅ Fixed — branched after v6.17
Proxmox VE8 (default)6.8.12-436.8.12-182025-12-15✅ Fixed
NixOSmaster6.18.546.12.492025-09-25✅ Fixed
NixOSrelease-26.056.18.546.18.292026-05-11✅ Fixed
NixOSUnstable6.18.536.12.492025-09-29✅ Fixed
NixOSUnstable (small)6.18.546.12.492025-09-26✅ Fixed
NixOSUnstable (nixpkgs)6.18.546.12.492025-09-27✅ Fixed
NixOS26.056.18.536.18.292026-05-25✅ Fixed
NixOS26.05 (small)6.18.546.18.292026-05-24✅ Fixed
Rocky Linux / RHEL106.12.0-211.60.1.el10_26.12.0-211.58.1.el10_22026-09-23✅ Fixed — RHSA-2026:70498
Rocky Linux / RHEL95.14.0-687.52.1.el9_85.14.0-687.50.1.el9_82026-09-24✅ Fixed — RHSA-2026:70459
Rocky Linux / RHEL84.18.0-553.168.1.el8_104.18.0-553.166.1.el8_102026-09-23✅ Fixed — RHSA-2026:70402
Amazon Linux2023 (default)6.1.186-228.3766.1.155-176.2822025-10-14✅ Fixed — ALAS2023-2025-1223
Amazon Linux2023 (6.12 opt-in)6.12.103-129.1976.12.53-69.1192025-10-27✅ Fixed — ALAS2023-2025-1254
Amazon Linux2023 (6.18 opt-in)6.18.48-109.1506.18.15-14.2172026-03-30✅ Fixed — stream born after v6.17

Linux kernel

The fix reached mainline at v6.17-rc7, through the crypto tree, and was backported to every maintained stable line within two weeks. Every branch created after v6.17 carries it from its first release.

6.16.y is end of life. It received the fix in 6.16.9 and stopped at 6.16.12; a host still on 6.16 should move to a maintained line.

A companion commit, d0ca0df179c4 (crypto: af_alg - Fix incorrect boolean values in af_alg_ctx, tracked as CVE-2025-40022), repairs a 1-bit-bitfield regression introduced by the fix and ships in the same or the next stable release. A kernel carrying 1b34cbbf4f01 is fixed for this CVE whether or not it also has that follow-up.

To check a tree directly: a fixed af_alg_sendmsg() (in crypto/af_alg.c) tests and sets a ctx->write ownership flag and returns -EBUSY when a second writer is already active; an unfixed one has no such flag and no -EBUSY path.

Debian

forky is testing, the future Debian 14. The opt-in kernels are separate source packages:

  • bookworm’s 6.12 opt-in is linux-6.12 in bookworm-security, trixie’s kernel rebuilt for bookworm.
  • bullseye’s 6.1 opt-in is linux-6.1, bookworm’s kernel rebuilt for bullseye.

bullseye (Debian 11) left LTS support on 2026-08-31. Both its kernels were fixed before then, but nothing further is coming — upgrade to bookworm or newer.

Debian’s stock kernels build the AF_ALG interface as modules (CONFIG_CRYPTO_USER_API_SKCIPHER=m, _AEAD=m), autoloaded on first use, so an unpatched Debian kernel is reachable by any local user.

Proxmox VE

Proxmox ships its own Ubuntu-derived kernels, so Debian’s status does not carry over. PVE 9’s default moved from 6.17 to the 7.0 kernel with PVE 9.2; PVE 8’s default is proxmox-kernel-6.8.

  • PVE 8 reached end of life in August 2026. Its 6.8 kernel is fixed for this bug but gets nothing further — upgrade to PVE 9.
  • Superseded series that never got the fix are still published: PVE 8’s proxmox-kernel-6.5, proxmox-kernel-6.2 and the bookworm-backports opt-in proxmox-kernel-6.11. A host booting one should switch to its release’s default kernel.
  • The 6.14 series (PVE 9.0’s original kernel, and a PVE 8 backport) received the fix (via Ubuntu’s 6.14.0-37.37) before Proxmox stopped updating it, but it is superseded too — move up to the default kernel.

Proxmox hosts run the AF_ALG interface like any Debian-derived system, so an unpatched node is reachable by any local user or unprivileged container account.

NixOS

Every NixOS channel and branch in the table defaults to linux_6_18 (linuxPackages), which carries the fix. Every other kernel series nixpkgs pins, linux_6_12 down to linux_5_10, carries it too.

Kernel updates land on nixpkgs master first and reach each channel once its Hydra jobset passes, so a channel can sit a few days behind master. The -small channels (nixos-unstable-small, nixos-26.05-small) run a reduced jobset and pick up kernel updates fastest.

Which ref a flake input follows:

  • github:NixOS/nixpkgs/nixos-unstable and github:NixOS/nixpkgs/nixos-26.05 follow those channels — the GitHub channel branches are updated to exactly the published channel pins.
  • A bare github:NixOS/nixpkgs with no ref follows master, and github:NixOS/nixpkgs/release-26.05 follows that branch. Both are ungated development branches — they carry a kernel bump as soon as it lands, often a day or more before a channel publishes it.
  • A bare nixpkgs registry input resolves by default to the nixpkgs-unstable channel: a separate channel aimed at Nix on other operating systems, not gated on the NixOS tests.

Rocky Linux / RHEL family

All three EL lines — EL10 (6.12-based), EL9 (5.14-based) and EL8 (4.18-based) — postdate the v2.6.38 introduction and build the AF_ALG interface, so all were in-window. RHEL 6 is not affected. Rocky’s rebuilds match Red Hat’s fixed builds exactly.

  • RHEL 7 ELS: fixed by RHSA-2026:71687 (kernel-rt RHSA-2026:71657). Rocky ships no EL7.
  • RHEL 8 kernel-rt: fixed by RHSA-2026:70403.
  • RHEL 9 kernel-rt: fixed by the same advisories as the regular kernel.

Red Hat rates the flaw lower than the kernel CNA does (see Risk notes), so the fix rode regular batch kernel updates rather than an out-of-cycle release.

AlmaLinux, CloudLinux and Oracle Linux’s Red Hat Compatible Kernel rebuild RHEL’s kernel, so they get the fix as they rebuild Red Hat’s advisories.

Amazon Linux

The three AL2023 streams are the default kernel package (6.1 line) and the opt-in kernel6.12 and kernel6.18 packages. kernel6.18 carried the fix from its first build, so it has no ALAS for this CVE; the other two were fixed by ALAS advisories.

Amazon Linux 2 reached end of support on 2026-06-30, after its kernel-5.10 and kernel-5.15 Extras streams took the fix (ALAS2KERNEL-5.10-2025-109, ALAS2KERNEL-5.15-2025-093). Nothing further is coming — migrate to AL2023.

Detection

Is the running kernel in the affected window and missing the fix? Every AF_ALG-capable kernel from 2.6.38 on is in-window; compare the running kernel against the Patch status table’s First fixed column for its series (distro builds below that number can still carry a backport — the table’s Status is the verdict):

uname -r

Is the AF_ALG interface built? The bug needs the cryptographic user API. Almost every distribution enables it as modules (algif_skcipher, algif_aead), autoloaded when a process binds an AF_ALG socket:

grep CONFIG_CRYPTO_USER_API /boot/config-$(uname -r)

Can this user reach it right now? Any local user can open and bind an AF_ALG skcipher socket with no privilege; a success here means the path is reachable from an unprivileged shell:

python3 -c 'import socket; s=socket.socket(socket.AF_ALG,socket.SOCK_SEQPACKET,0); s.bind(("skcipher","cbc(aes)")); print("AF_ALG reachable")'

Are the modules already loaded? A loaded algif_* module means the interface is in use; an unloaded one is not protection, since binding an AF_ALG socket autoloads it:

lsmod | grep -E '^(af_alg|algif_)'

Mitigation

The real fix is a patched kernel (the 1b34cbbf4f01 backport). Unlike the container-escape class of kernel LPEs, this bug needs no capability and no namespace — every local user can reach AF_ALG directly — so disabling unprivileged user namespaces does nothing here. Until a fixed kernel is installed, the only lever is to take away the AF_ALG interface itself, on hosts that do not use the kernel crypto user API (most do not; userspace normally uses libcrypto/OpenSSL, not AF_ALG).

Block the AF_ALG modules

Where nothing on the host uses the kernel crypto user API, block the interface so the vulnerable code cannot load. This is Red Hat’s recommended mitigation. Test first — cryptsetup, some IPsec setups, and a few crypto-offload tools do use AF_ALG:

echo 'install algif_skcipher /bin/false' | sudo tee /etc/modprobe.d/cve-2025-39964.conf

Block the AEAD interface the same way, since it shares the vulnerable code:

echo 'install algif_aead /bin/false' | sudo tee -a /etc/modprobe.d/cve-2025-39964.conf

To cover every algorithm type at once, block the af_alg core module instead, which the algif_* modules depend on:

echo 'install af_alg /bin/false' | sudo tee /etc/modprobe.d/cve-2025-39964.conf

Risk notes

  • It is in the CISA KEV catalog with a same-week deadline. CISA added CVE-2025-39964 on 2026-09-18 with a BOD 26-04 remediation date of 2026-09-21 and marked exploitation active; Red Hat likewise notes known public exploits. Federal civilian agencies must remediate on that timeline, and every in-window multi-user host should be treated as a live target.
  • A working public exploit exists. The PoC is a self-tuning local-root exploit that overwrites core_pattern; it uses hardcoded kernel offsets, so adapting it to a given kernel is grooming work, not research.
  • Reachable by any local user, with no capability. bind() and setkey() on an AF_ALG socket check no capability, and the modules autoload, so an ordinary shell account — including one inside an unprivileged container — can trigger the race. There is no namespace or capability mitigation; only a patched kernel or a blocked module closes it.
  • The severity scores diverge. The kernel CNA and NVD’s CNA metric rate this 7.8 HIGH, treating the corruption as a full confidentiality/integrity/availability break (kernel memory read, controlled write, LPE). Red Hat rates it 7.3 Moderate (confidentiality-high, integrity-low, availability-high), and NVD’s own metric sits lower still at 5.5, availability-only — a difference in how completely each judges the scatterlist underflow to be weaponisable, not a disagreement about the bug. The public PoC’s controlled write supports the higher reading.
  • No kernel is too old to be affected. The bug dates from v2.6.38 (2011). Every in-support distribution kernel is in-window and unsafe until it carries the backport.

Verification log

Every verdict in the table above is backed by a checkable source. This log records the provenance — the advisory, repository index, or git reference that established each fact — so any row can be audited or reproduced. Most readers never need it.

Full verification log

Upstream

  • Fix commit (via git show in ~/src/linux/stable):
    • 1b34cbbf4f011a121ef7b2d7d6e6920a036d5285 — crypto: af_alg - Disallow concurrent writes in af_alg_sendmsg.
    • Authored 2025-09-18 by Herbert Xu; Reported-by Muhammad Alifa Ramdhan and Bing-Jhong Billy Jheng (STAR Labs SG).
    • Touches crypto/af_alg.c and include/crypto/if_alg.h.
    • Carries Fixes: 8ff590903d5 and merged for v6.17 via dcf7d9e0aee5 (Merge tag ‘v6.17-p3’ … crypto-2.6).
    • git describe --contains → v6.17-rc7~14^2.
  • Introducing commit (via git show in ~/src/linux/stable):
    • 8ff590903d5fc7f5a0a988c38267a3d08e6393a2 — crypto: algif_skcipher - User-space interface for skcipher operations.
    • git describe --contains → v2.6.38-rc1~238^2~38; v2.6.38 tagged 2011-03-14.
  • Release tag dates (via git log -1 --format=%cd <tag> in ~/src/linux/stable):
    • v6.17-rc7 — 2025-09-21; v6.17 — 2025-09-28.
    • v6.1.154, v6.6.108, v6.12.49, v6.16.9 — 2025-09-25.
    • v5.15.194, v5.10.245 — 2025-10-02.
    • v6.18 — 2025-11-30; v7.2 — 2026-08-16 (both branched after v6.17, so born with the fix).
  • Stable backports (via git log origin/linux-<series>.y --grep='Disallow concurrent writes in af_alg_sendmsg' in ~/src/linux/stable; one hit per branch with the fix’s own subject):
    • 6.16.y — 45bcf60fe49b.
    • 6.12.y — 9aee87da5572.
    • 6.6.y — 7c4491b5644e.
    • 6.1.y — 1f323a48e9b5.
    • 5.15.y — e4c1ec11132e.
    • 5.10.y — 0f28c4adbc4a.
    • 6.16.y reached EOL at v6.16.12 (2025-10-12), after the fix.
  • Current point releases (via https://www.kernel.org/finger_banner):
    • Current kernel for every Linux kernel row is read from the banner’s per-series line.
  • CVE record (via git show origin/master:cve/published/2025/CVE-2025-39964.{dyad,json,cvss} in ~/src/linux/vulns):
    • The dyad holds seven 2.6.38:8ff590903d5f:<fixed> pairs — 5.10.245, 5.15.194, 6.1.154, 6.6.108, 6.12.49, 6.16.9, and 6.17 (mainline) — matching the backports above.
    • The .json lists crypto/af_alg.c and include/crypto/if_alg.h as the affected files.
    • The .cvss file scores CVSS 3.1 7.8 (AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H), with a rationale describing the underflowed scatterlist, the af_alg_pull_tsgl() disclosure primitive, and the memcpy_from_msg() controlled write.
  • Scores and lists (via the NVD 2.0 API, Red Hat’s hydra securitydata JSON, the FIRST EPSS API, and the CISA KEV feed):
    • NVD (record Analyzed): the CNA metric is 7.8; NVD’s own metric is 5.5 (C:N/I:N/A:H).
    • Red Hat: cvss3_base_score 7.3 (AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:H), status draft; threat_severity Moderate.
    • EPSS 0.0079 (percentile 0.543).
    • CISA KEV: dateAdded 2026-09-18, dueDate 2026-09-21, knownRansomwareCampaignUse Unknown, cwes CWE-362; cve.org’s CISA-ADP SSVC block records Exploitation active.
  • Public exploit (via the GitHub API):
    • n1k0oowang/CVE-2025-39964_EXP — a C exploit (exploit.c) created 2025-11-13; it hardcodes page_offset_base / vmemmap_base / core_pattern offsets and roots the host by overwriting /proc/sys/kernel/core_pattern.

Distributions

  • Debian (via the security tracker JSON, the dak madison API, the DSA/DLA advisories, and snapshot.debian.org):
    • Tracker: sid, forky, trixie, and bookworm all resolved; base fixed version 6.16.9-1 (sid/forky), 6.12.57-1 (trixie), 6.1.158-1 (bookworm).
    • sid Fixed since: first_seen of 6.16.9-1 on snapshot.debian.org, 2025-09-27 (the upload to unstable).
    • forky Fixed since: linux 6.16.9-1 MIGRATED to testing, 2025-10-04 (package news) — the migration date, later than sid’s upload.
    • trixie Fixed since: first_seen of 6.12.57-1 on snapshot.debian.org, 2025-11-06.
    • bookworm Fixed since: DSA-6053-1, 2025-11-11 (fixed version 6.1.158-1).
    • bookworm 6.12 opt-in: linux-6.12 in bookworm-security; first appeared at 6.12.100-1~deb12u1, first_seen 2026-08-04, already past the 6.12 branch fix.
    • bullseye (LTS ended 2026-08-31): DLA-4404-1 (2025-12-12) fixed the 5.10 kernel at 5.10.247-1; DLA-4379-1 (2025-11-25) fixed the linux-6.1 opt-in at 6.1.158-1~deb11u1. Current cells are the final bullseye-security builds.
    • Current kernel per suite is the security-tracker repositories version of linux where a -security entry exists, the plain suite version otherwise (sid, forky), and the -security Sources index version of linux / linux-6.1 for bullseye.
  • Proxmox VE (via pve-no-subscription Packages.gz, the ~/src/proxmox/pve-kernel changelogs, the PVE roadmap, and Ubuntu’s CVE JSON):
    • proxmox-default-kernel depends on proxmox-kernel-7.0 on the current PVE 9 (default 7.0 since PVE 9.2, 2026-05-21) and on proxmox-kernel-6.8 on PVE 8.
    • Current kernel is the highest proxmox-kernel-<series> metapackage version in pve-no-subscription.
    • 7.0 and 6.17 branched after v6.17, so both carry the fix; the 6.17 series first shipped at 6.17.0-1 (2025-10-06).
    • PVE 8 6.8: debian/changelog on origin/bookworm-6.8 shows update source and patches to Ubuntu-6.8.0-90.91 at 6.8.12-18, 2025-12-15; Ubuntu fixed 6.8 at 6.8.0-90.91.
    • PVE 8 reached end of life in 2026-08 (Proxmox VE FAQ lifecycle table, pve.proxmox.com/wiki/FAQ), before this tracker existed.
    • Series stopped before the fix (no row): PVE 8 proxmox-kernel-6.11 (last built 2025-03-16), -6.5, and -6.2.
  • NixOS (via channels.nixos.org/<channel>/git-revision → kernels-org.json in ~/src/nixos/nixpkgs, packageAliases.linux_default in linux-kernels.nix, and scripts/nixos-first-shipped):
    • linux_default is linux_6_18 on both master and release-26.05.
    • The fix first entered nixpkgs through the linux_6_12: 6.12.48 -> 6.12.49 bump 0d28f1e37baa on master, committed 2025-09-25 (then the default series).
    • First channel release containing that bump: nixos-unstable-small 2025-09-26, nixpkgs-unstable 2025-09-27, nixos-unstable 2025-09-29.
    • release-26.05 was cut 2026-05-11 already carrying a fixed 6.18 default; its channels first published 2026-05-24 (-small) and 2026-05-25.
    • Current kernel per row is the 6.18 entry of kernels-org.json at that ref — the branch tip for master / release-26.05, the channel’s git-revision pin for the rest.
  • Rocky Linux / RHEL (via Red Hat’s hydra securitydata JSON and CSAF/VEX record, the Rocky BaseOS x86_64 primary.xml.gz, and OSV):
    • RHSA-2026:70498 (RHEL 10, kernel-0:6.12.0-211.58.1.el10_2, 2026-09-23), listed in affected_release.
    • RHSA-2026:70459 (RHEL 9, kernel-0:5.14.0-687.50.1.el9_8, 2026-09-23), listed in affected_release.
    • RHSA-2026:70402 (RHEL 8, kernel-0:4.18.0-553.166.1.el8_10, 2026-09-22), listed in affected_release; kernel-rt fixed alongside by RHSA-2026:70403.
    • RHEL 7 Extended Lifecycle Support: RHSA-2026:71687 (kernel-0:3.10.0-1160.164.1.el7, 2026-09-24).
    • The CSAF/VEX record (security.access.redhat.com/data/csaf/v2/vex/2025/cve-2025-39964.json) lists RHSA-2026:71657 (RHEL 7 ELS kernel-rt, kernel-rt-0:3.10.0-1160.164.1.rt56.1316.el7) among its vendor_fix remediations.
    • The VEX record lists RHEL 9 kernel-rt as known_affected, but RHSA-2026:70459 also covers the RHEL 9.8 RT and NFV products.
    • package_state lists RHEL 9 kernel-rt Affected and RHEL 6 kernel Not affected.
    • threat_severity Moderate; Red Hat’s mitigation is to blacklist the af_alg module.
    • Rocky BaseOS carries all three fixed NVRs exactly, and its highest kernel build (RPM order) is at or above each.
    • Fixed since per release is the <time file=…> build timestamp of that exact name=kernel/version entry in primary.xml.gz (via an xq XPath query) — Rocky’s own rebuild date, a day or same-day after each RHSA.
    • Rocky 10 rebuilt 2026-09-23.
    • Rocky 9 rebuilt 2026-09-24.
    • Rocky 8 rebuilt 2026-09-23.
    • AlmaLinux has no matching entry in OSV (api.osv.dev/v1/vulns/CVE-2025-39964), but is a same-source rebuild like Rocky.
    • Current kernel per release is the highest kernel ver/rel in primary.xml.gz, compared by RPM rules.
  • Amazon Linux (via the AL2023 and AL2 repodata primary.xml.gz and updateinfo.xml.gz, parsed with scripts/alas-cve):
    • Streams present on AL2023: kernel (6.1), kernel6.12, kernel6.18.
    • alas-cve CVE-2025-39964: ALAS2023-2025-1223 (2025-10-14, kernel 6.1.155-176.282) and ALAS2023-2025-1254 (2025-10-27, kernel6.12 6.12.53-69.119).
    • kernel6.18 stream: no advisory names this CVE (born after v6.17); its earliest published build in the repodata is 6.18.15-14.217 (ALAS2023-2026-1514, 2026-03-30), used as its Fixed since.
    • Current kernel is the highest ver-rel per stream.
    • AL2 Extras (EOL 2026-06-30): ALAS2KERNEL-5.10-2025-109 and ALAS2KERNEL-5.15-2025-093, both 2025-10-27.

References

SourceURL
CISA KEV cataloghttps://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog
CVE record (cve.org)https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2025-39964
NVD entryhttps://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-39964
Kernel fixhttps://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/1b34cbbf4f011a121ef7b2d7d6e6920a036d5285
Introducing commithttps://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/8ff590903d5fc7f5a0a988c38267a3d08e6393a2
Public PoChttps://github.com/n1k0oowang/CVE-2025-39964_EXP
BOD 26-04https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/directives/bod-26-04-prioritizing-security-updates-based-risk
stable point release bannerhttps://www.kernel.org/finger_banner
Debian security trackerhttps://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2025-39964
Ubuntu security trackerhttps://ubuntu.com/security/CVE-2025-39964
Red Hat CVE pagehttps://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2025-39964
Amazon Linux ALAShttps://alas.aws.amazon.com/